The Guardianship of a Woman, Part VIII: Conclusion

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The results of all this have been to lock all those in modern society into a box. Even if we are unhappy, nobody is to question the dogma of “gender equality” as some kind of humane aspiration and social good. But has it done good? When the Federal Government first got involved in the civil rights game after the Civil War, they ran into opposition from president Andrew Johnson, who had succeeded Lincoln after his assassination. Despite Johnson’s loyalty to the union, he could not support such a broad extension of Federal power and clung to his Jeffersonian and Jacksonian beliefs in a limited Federal government. Despite modern beliefs about racism and civil rights, Johnson’s veto of the 1866 Civil Rights Act (easily and promptly overridden by Congress) gives a chilling premonition in light of modern circumstances and the absurd ways in which the “equal protection” clause of the Fourteenth Amendment[41] has been expanded far beyond the intentions of its framers:

I do not propose to consider the policy of this bill…Capital, it is true, has more intelligence, but labor is never so ignorant as not to understand its own interests, not to know its own value, and not to see that capital must pay that value.

This bill frustrates this adjustment. It intervenes between capital and labor and attempts to settle questions of political economy through the agency of numerous officials whose interest it will be to foment discord…

In all our history, in all our experience as a people living under Federal and State law, no such system as that contemplated by the details of this bill has ever before been proposed or adopted…[It] interfere[s] with the municipal legislation of the States, with the relations existing exclusively between a State and its citizens, or between inhabitants of the same State- an absorption and assumption of power by the General Government which, if acquiesced in, must sap and destroy our federative system of limited powers and break down the barriers which preserve the rights of the States. It is another step, or rather stride, toward centralization and the concentration of all legislative powers in the National Government. The tendency of the bill must be to resuscitate the spirit of rebellion and to arrest the progress of those influences which are more closely drawing around the states the bonds of union and peace.[42]

But our Founding Fathers left to the American people the right to appeal to our legislators and to appeal to the courts to redress any wrongs and grievances. I do here and now so appeal. I appeal to the legislators of the states, I appeal to the courts of competent jurisdiction, and I appeal to the Representatives and Senators of the United States Congress that feminism has been a mistake since its very inception, and that the distinctiveness of the natures of the male and female sexes must be acknowledged, upheld, and- at the most personal level- delighted in for all the ways in which nature has so carefully designed them. It must also be considered why we continue to indulge in and be obsessed with “equality” of the sexes. Do we do so only because we have been taught to do so? Do we do so only because of what was once the beliefs of a radical minority that pushed and prodded and campaigned until legislators and the courts finally caved in to their demands? Is it blind adherence to dogma without reason or critical reflection? For the liberty and welfare of the people, for the safeguarding of our families to ensure to our offspring their best chances of succeeding in life, and to truly find peace and happiness, I appeal– unless we are to conceded that we are all slaves to the state and are to be ruled by a tiny and vocal minority while our happiness and humanity is thrust aside in the name of a fictitious and fanciful view of fairness and equality.


[41] U. S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1-2 states, (emphasis added) “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws…But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.”

So why is an amendment that itself clearly discriminates on the basis of sex being used to hold that discrimination based upon sex is unconstitutional, according to that very same amendment? This amendment was clearly intended to protect African-American males from the tyranny of the Southern states. So what happened? Perhaps the answer can be found in the words of the late Supreme Court justice William J. Brennan, Jr.: “Five votes. Five votes can do anything around here.” The Constitutionalist by Nat Hentoff, (Last Visited December 5, 2018).

[42] Quoted in Urofsky & Finkelman, Documents of American Constitutional and Legal History, Volume I, p. 472

The Guardianship of a Woman, Part VII: The Coercive Nature of Equality

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The Coercive Nature of Equality


Given the great insistence on a woman’s weakness and her dependence upon the male sex for her provision and protection among the ancients as well as our own ancestors, it is no wonder that the entire premise of feminism and goal of gender equality has been entirely contingent upon arbitrary, punitive and absolutist measures that would annihilate all views and thoughts in law and in the hearts and minds of the citizenry that women are ever in any way weaker than men or in need of protection and provision from them. Something that has existed since time immemorial cannot solely be wiped out overnight. It requires a constant reconditioning of the mind as well as governmental action and mainstream media propaganda to sustain the myths and the lies. In an 1860 Georgia decision, a justice declared that female honor was “…worth much more than everything, even life itself. All other contracts may be rescinded, and the parties restored to their former conditions; marriage cannot be undone.”[34] Now marriages are consistently undone in a way that Chancellor James Kent had once described as “shameful”[35] and the modern “empowered” woman, in order to maintain her emancipation from the male sex must now submit to being used by him via casual sexual intercourse, must submit herself to abortion, combat duty and civic obligations, and the wife and the mother of young children must submit herself to the workforce in order to maintain the dogma of gender equality- a dogma that has no basis in nature, reason nor common sense- in order to continue to be “empowered.”

In the House of Representatives of the United States Congress debate on the Equal Pay Act of 1963 on May 23, 1963, Representative Colmer stated

I doubt seriously, Mr. Speaker, if this bill is constitutional. I do not like the idea of pointing out women here as if they are an inferior group and that the Federal government with its strong arm must step in and try to protect them. I think they can stand on their own. They have been doing that for many, many generations.

Mr. Speaker, there are many instances where women are entitled to more pay than the opposite sex and why should we just put them on an equal basis? This strikes at the merit system…[36]

So, it was obviously doubtful even to representatives what the constitutionality of equal pay even was. An Equal Rights Amendment to the Federal Constitution might have made it constitutional (though the reach of such an amendment would probably have still been limited). Throughout the 1970s and even beyond, the Equal Rights Amendment was constantly pushed upon the states and lobbied for, though thanks to grassroots organization it never made it into the United States Constitution. Nevertheless, that did not stop the United States Supreme Court from going wild, declaring that any law whatsoever that would recognize a difference between males and females was somehow unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Only thanks to Right-leaning appointees to the Burger and Rehnquist Courts is it that all such legislation has not been deemed unconstitutional,[37] even if eradicated nonetheless by subsequent legislation. Old ways do not die easily. Even before that time it appears that women were only included in the Civil Rights Act of 1964- which initially only banned discrimination on the basis of race, not sex- because the bill, if passed into law, would unduly penalize and discriminate against white women. From the Congressional debates of 1964:

Mr. ANDREWS of Alabama…I rise in support of this amendment offered by the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Smith]. Unless this amendment is adopted, the white women of this country would be drastically discriminated against in favor of a Negro woman.

If a white woman and a Negro woman applied for the same job, and each woman had the identical qualifications, the chances are about 99 to 1 that the Negro woman would be given the job because if the employer did not give the job to the Negro woman he could be prosecuted under this bill. Failure to employ the white woman would not subject the employer to such action…

Mr. Rivers of South Carolina. I rise in support of the amendment offered by the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Smith] making it possible for the white Christian woman to receive the same consideration for employment as the colored woman. It is incredible to me that the authors of this monstrosity- whomever they are- would deprive the white woman of mostly Anglo-Saxon or Christian heritage equal opportunity before the employer. I know this Congress will not be a party to such an evil.

Mr. Smith of Virginia…I put a question to you in behalf of the white women of the Untied States. Let us assume that two women apply for the same job and both of them are equally eligible, one a white woman and one a Negro woman. The first thing that employer will look at will be the provision with regard to the records he must keep. If he does not employ that colored woman and has to make that record, that employer will say, “Well, now, if I hire the colored woman I will not be in any trouble, but if I do not hire the colored woman and hire the white woman, then the Commission is going to be looking down my throat and will want to know why I did not. I may be in a lawsuit…”[38]

So, more legislation must be passed (or amended) to counter the ill effects of the first legislation, almost like successive medication for a terminal illness. The coercive and irrational nature of this cannot be understated. The feminist/egalitarian goal has been that Federal legislation and the courts must enforce that there are no fundamental differences between the sexes in any area of life that should be lawfully taken account of. Established commissions, agencies, coercive Federal legislation must be implemented to enforce “equality” so that all citizens fall in line: the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, the 1993 Family and Medical Leave Act; Supreme Court cases; Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979), Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980), Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975), Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). It would be wrong to think that men should not be provided for by their wives as a denial of “equality” or that they do not need benefits the same as women; There can be no discrimination against pregnant women Cleveland Board of Education v. Lafleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977); Unlike in Muller, a woman’s childbearing capacity cannot be taken into account Automobile Workers v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187 (1991); The courts must get involved in making sure men and women are considered equally in employment cases Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987), Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984), sexual harassment, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, 523 U.S. 75 (1998)… The husband cannot be the “head of household” or “provider” Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983), Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975), Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981); Companies cannot refuse to hire mothers with young children if they would hire fathers with young children Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971); Women must be subject to the same civic obligations as men- family life or marital status notwithstanding- J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994), Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); The courts and legislatures must go further and expand “equal protection,” as now marriage itself cannot even be defined by sex, so that no state can ever regard marriage as a privileged institution between one man and one woman, because gender cannot exist even at this most basic level United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S._ (2013), Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S._ (2015). Marriage itself must be knocked down from its once honorable pedestal and degraded.

Notice a trend? Almost all of these cases (all are either United States Supreme Court cases or Congressional legislation) occur primarily at the time of the heydays of the feminist movement. They are not based in reason, but the ever-changing whims and passions of society. It’s all about tearing down supposed “stereotypes-” stereotypes that our ancestors knew to be based in common-sense, reason, and justice. Moreover, some of the legislation and court cases appear to transfer the burden for providing onto the state or the private/public employer, as it is now unconstitutional to impose it solely upon the husband and father[39] (except the rare case, such as Orr v. Orr, because it allows the burden of spousal support to fall upon the wife[40], thereby being gender-neutral and, according to the whims of six men in robes, constitutional).

It would be absurdly unreasonable to continue to list every court case or piece of legislation out there, but the motive is clear: There is nothing special or unique about having been born either being male or female. At every level of life, all special distinctions or privileges that one might acquire based upon sex must be annihilated. Whether in day-to-day interactions, marriage, employment, military combat, sex or child-rearing…we must deny that gender exists. Such a thing has been carried so far that parents today have begun to allow their minor children (whom are yet unable to contract, marry, hold full-time employment or even lead independent lives and make any other important decisions for themselves) to choose which sex they wish to belong to, it’s being pushed recently that it’s discriminatory to have separate public restrooms for males and females (women take longer, therefore they are discriminated against or transgender individuals might not know which restroom to use), and women are no longer “women” but “non-men” or some other gender-neutral designation. Sex and gender must be obliterated by any arbitrary measures- whether Federal legislation, appellate court decisions, public policy or science and technology. Passion and love must be gone, our unique sense of humanness- of maleness or of femaleness- must be denied. Women are no longer precious (and men better not see them that way), sex and procreation are casual things, marriage is an obsolete, optional, gender-neutral institution and children belong in the custody of whoever is available and capable of taking them. And if anyone dares acknowledge that gender exists, the whole power of local, state, and federal- perhaps even international- law will put such thinking back where it belongs- in a history museum. Everyone must fall in line with the social engineering of the past several decades and nobody is to question it.


[34] Asken v. Dupree, 30 Ga. 173, 190 (1860), quoted in Grossberg, Governing the Hearth, Law and the Family in Nineteenth Century America, p. 82.

[35] Kent had exclaimed in his Commentaries on American Law, Vol II, p. 101 that “…the graver Romans permitted the liberty of divorce to a most injurious and shameful degree,” indicating his personal feelings on the matter that such liberal custom for divorce was “shameful.”

[36] Quoted in Fisher & Harriger, American Constitutional Law, Volume 2Tenth EditionCivil Rights and Civil Liberties, p. 854.

[37] See also cases Rostker v. Goldberg 453 U.S. 57 (1981); Michael H. v. Gerald D 491 U.S. 110 (1989); Michael M. v. Sonoma County Superior Court, supra, note 30.; Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998).

[38] Quoted in Fisher & Harriger, American Constitutional Law, Volume 2, Tenth Edition, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, pp. 855-56. The amendment (by Congressman Howard Smith of Virginia whom they are speaking of) to prohibit sex discrimination on top of race was apparently introduced to keep the bill from passing.

[39] Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Book the First, p.477, states: “And the president Montesquieu has a very just observation upon this head: that the establishment of marriage in all civilized states is built on this natural obligation of the father to provide for his children; for that ascertains and makes known the person who is bound to fulfil this obligation: whereas, in promiscuous and illicit conjunctions, the father is unknown; and the mother finds a thousand obstacles in her way;- shame, remorse, the constraint of her sex, and the rigor of laws;- that stifle her inclinations to perform this duty: and besides, she generally wants ability.”

The obvious goal of the feminist movement was to remove all of the “obstacles in her way” and the “shame, remorse” and “constraints of her sex, and the rigor of the laws,” and to remove the natural obligation arising from marriage that imposes upon the husband the obligation for provide for his wife, both enabling and forcing financial and legal independence upon the female sex, whether either sex truly wants such a thing or not. But who benefits from this new arrangement? Who loses?

[40] The Romans thought this to be unnatural and, furthermore, improper. See Frier & McGinn, A Casebook on Roman Family Law, p. 146. “Can a Wife Give Her Husband an Allowance? This is held to be an improper gift and, furthermore, ‘inconsistent with and contrary to the nature of her sex’ (Ulpian, D.”

The Guardianship of a Woman, Part VI: The Weakness of Her Sex

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The Weakness of Her Sex


If one looks at all of the writings of the ancients, and indeed, even down well into the twentieth century, it is found that there is always great emphasis on a woman’s “weakness-” both physical and mental- and on the duty of the male sex to provide for and protect women. The Romans had called a woman’s weakness infirmitas sexus and levitas animi. As the jurist Gaius says of the perpetual tutelage of women: “For the ancestors (veteres) wanted women, even adult women, to be in tutelage because of their levitas animi.”[24] And likewise, Cicero, “Our ancestors wanted all women to be under a tutor’s power because of the weakness of their judgment.”[25]

Guardianship of women was an ancient custom oftentimes even among unmarried women after they had reached adulthood. As Blackstone had explained it,

Among the ancient Greeks and Romans women were never of age but subject to perpetual guardianship, unless when married “nisi convenissent in manum viri:” and, when that perpetual tutelage wore away in process of time, we find that, in females as well as males, full age was not till twenty-five years.[26]

Though the laws and customs of England and America had no guardianship of adult unmarried women, women in Rome (even in the classical and post-classical period), were subject to perpetual tutelage. The Romans also held many of the same common-sense notions that our own traditional laws of England and America had held until arbitrary anti-sex discrimination legislation began to be forcibly pushed through Congress, state legislatures, and the courts:

In the early Roman Empire, as in most Western societies until the success of the women’s suffrage movement in the early twentieth century, women were citizens but were nonetheless legally barred from voting, holding magistracies, serving as jurors, and generally performing what were thought of as public duties.

(Ulpian in the first book on Sabinus)

Women are excluded from all civic and public duties (official civilia vel publica), and so they cannot be judges (iudices), hold magistracies, bring legal claims for others (postulare), represent others in court, or act as procurators (for others in lawsuits).

(Paul in the seventeenth book on the Edict)

Moreover, not everyone can be appointed a judge (iudex) by those who have the right to appoint judges. Certain kinds of persons are prevented from acting as judges by statute, by nature, or by convention…By convention, there are women and slaves, not because they do not possess judgment, but because it is traditional that they do not preform civic duties (civilia official).[27]

A “son-in-power” (in other words, a son who was still under the authority of his father (or grandfather if he was still living), as all children were perpetually under the authority of the male head-of-household, or pater familias, even in adulthood until he either died or they were emancipated) was also in a different position than a daughter-in power, as Roman law did not conceive that a daughter could be competent enough to truly enter into contracts or be held liable the same as her brother might be:

…if sons are otherwise qualified (of adult age, sane, and so on), they possess full capacity to contract with a third party. By contrast, as Gaius says, daughters-in-power (and also wives in archaic manus marriages), cannot be obligated to anyone; that is, they lack the capacity to make a contract that is binding upon themselves…Suppose that a daughter-in-power borrows from a neighbor a piece of jewelry which she then carelessly damages. According to Ulpian (D., she herself cannot be sued on the contract for damaging the jewelry, and her pater familias can be sued only up to the value of her peculium, if she has one…[28]

The Romans, not only placing great emphasis on feminine weakness, also placed a great deal of value upon female sexuality. In particular, the Romans (as in all civilizations, including our own until recently), implemented protective legislation into their laws to protect especially virtuous women in their sexuality and placed great weight upon a woman’s fidelity in marriage. As Frier & McGinn describe it (and as described by the late classical Roman jurist Ulpian), Roman law protected women and adolescent males- but not adult males- from the sexual harassment of predatory males who make their advances “contrary to good morals.” Frier & McGinn further ask the question: “Is it fair to argue that…Roman law was based on a policy goal of difference between the sexes (where harassment undermines the ‘privileged status’ of women)?”[29]

Our own historical laws can be referred to, as well as the opinions of judges and learned men of ages past, to see that our laws and social values have always (again, until very recently) acknowledged that male and female sexuality are completely different things, and that men and women oftentimes have special circumstances not shared by the opposite sex. Not too far gone in history, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled against the male plaintiff in the case of Michael M. V. Sonoma County Superior Court 450 U.S. 464 (1981), who contended that California’s statutory rape law “…unlawfully discriminated on the basis of gender since men alone were criminally liable.”[30] But Justice William H. Rehnquist and four other of his contemporaries weren’t buying it:

 But because the Equal Protection Clause does not “demand that a statute necessarily apply equally to all persons” or require “things which are different in fact . . . to be treated in law as though they were the same…'” This Court has consistently upheld statutes where the gender classification is not invidious, but rather realistically reflects the fact that the sexes are not similarly situated in certain circumstances. As the Court has stated, a legislature may “provide for the special problems of women.”

We need not be medical doctors to discern that young men and young women are not similarly situated with respect to the problems and the risks of sexual intercourse. Only women may become pregnant, and they suffer disproportionately the profound physical, emotional, and psychological consequences of sexual activity. The statute at issue here protects women from sexual intercourse at an age when those consequences are particularly severe.

The question thus boils down to whether a State may attack the problem of sexual intercourse and teenage pregnancy directly by prohibiting a male from having sexual intercourse with a minor female. We hold that such a statute is sufficiently related to the State’s objectives to pass constitutional muster.

Because virtually all of the significant harmful and inescapably identifiable consequences of teenage pregnancy fall on the young female, a legislature acts well within its authority when it elects to punish only the participant who, by nature, suffers few of the consequences of his conduct. It is hardly unreasonable for a legislature acting to protect minor females to exclude them from punishment. Moreover, the risk of pregnancy itself constitutes a substantial deterrence to young females. No similar natural sanctions deter males. A criminal sanction imposed solely on males thus serves to roughly “equalize” the deterrents on the sexes…

In upholding the California statute, we also recognize that this is not a case where a statute is being challenged on the grounds that it “invidiously discriminates” against females.

To the contrary, the statute places a burden on males which is not shared by females. But we find nothing to suggest that men, because of past discrimination or peculiar disadvantages, are in need of the special solicitude of the courts. Nor is this a case where the gender classification is made “solely for . . . administrative convenience…” or rests on “the baggage of sexual stereotypes.” As we have held, the statute instead reasonably reflects the fact that the consequences of sexual intercourse and pregnancy fall more heavily on the female than on the male…[31]

Other cases may be referred to, and there is certainly evidence that the Founding Fathers did not envision the society that we have today. Not only does the Constitution of the United States forbid either Congress or the states from “impairing the obligation of contracts”[32] and thereby calling into question the entire constitutionality of all legislation attempting to make men and women equal out in the working world, but it can never be supposed that they meant for the Constitution to impose all of the same rights and duties upon both sexes in every sphere of life either. Consider the infamous instance of Abigail Adams, when writing to her husband -arguably among the most famous of the Founding Fathers-, John Adams, that he “remember the ladies:”

On March 31, 1776, Abigail Adams appealed to her husband, John Adams, who was busily engaged with the Continental Congress in Philadelphia. She urged that “in the new code of laws which I suppose it will be necessary for you to make, I desire you would remember the ladies…” His curt reply mirrored the attitude of the times: “As to your extraordinary code of laws, I cannot but laugh.”[33]

Significantly, in Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1875), Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292 (1924), Goesart v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948); Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961), and other peculiar state cases such as the Oregon Supreme Court case of State v. Hunter, 300 P.2d 455 (Ore. 1956). Cases such as MullerRadice, and Goesart upheld protective legislation for women, on the grounds of female weakness, women’s role as the bearer of the children, and of man’s duty to safeguard female sexuality and be the providers of women and children, with the justices issuing what I would consider very beautiful- if paternalistic and romantic- opinions.

These cases have since been overturned, of course, leaving no room for either Congress or the states to enact any kind of legislation- no matter how much it might appeal to the common sense and reason of mankind nor how necessary a legislature might deem it to protect the family- that would treat the sexes differently, leading to many arbitrary abuses, confusion, instability, and injustice as a result.


[24] Frier & MgGinn, A Casebook on Roman Family Law, p. 450.

[25] Ibid.

[26] James Stewart, The Rights of Persons, According to the Text of Blackstone, Incorporating the Alterations Down To the Present Time (London, 1839), p. 499.

[27] Frier & McGinn, A Casebook on Roman Family Law, p. 457.

[28] Ibid., p. 251.

[29] Ibid., p. 469.

[30] Fisher & Harriger, American Constitutional Law, Volume 2, Tenth Edition: Constitutional Rights, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, p. 869.

[31] Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 469-76 (1981).

[32] U.S. Const. art.I, §10. “No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.”

[33] Fisher & Harriger, American Constitutional Law, Volume 2, Tenth Edition, Constitutional Rights, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, p. 845.

The Guardianship of a Woman, Part V: The Disabilities of Her Sex

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The Disabilities of Her Sex


But what are these disabilities of the female sex pre-feminism? The married woman was a feme covert, but the single woman laid under no such disability as the married woman, the law giving to her almost all of the same rights as that of her male counterparts. Consider the Illinois case of Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill._ (1895):

…It will not be denied that woman is entitled to the same rights, under the constitution, to make contracts with reference to her labor, as are secured thereby to men…It has been held that a woman is both a “citizen” and a “person” within the meaning of [the Fourteenth Amendment] …As a “citizen,” woman has the right to acquire and possess property of every kind. As a “person,” she has the right to claim the benefit of the constitutional provision that she shall not be deprived of life liberty, or property without due process of law. Involved in these rights thus guarantied to her is the right to make and enforce contracts. The law accords to her, as to every other citizen, the right to gain a livelihood by intelligence, honesty, and industry in the arts, the sciences, the professions, or other vocations. Before the law, her right to a choice of vocations cannot be said to be denied or abridged on account of sex…As a general thing, it is the province of the legislature to determine what regulations are necessary to protect the public health and secure the public safety and welfare. But, inasmuch as sex is no bar, under the constitution and law, to the endowment of woman with the fundamental and inalienable rights of liberty and property, which include the right to make her own contracts, the mere fact of sex will not justify the legislature in putting forth the police power of the state for the purpose of limiting her exercise of those rights, unless the courts are able to see that there is some fair, just, and reasonable connection between such limitation and the public health, safety, or welfare proposed to be secured by it.[19]

There is no evidence that a non-married woman was ever denied the right of the pursuit of life, liberty and happiness except where the state had a very rational interest in limiting her affairs in the civic and political realm. But such restrictions were done sparingly, and only upon a showing of that rational justification based upon what had always been, until fairly recently, an acknowledgement by society and the law of the basic facts of life and the very real needs and differences between the sexes based upon which society had a very real stake in acknowledging their different treatment under the law. As regards the political realm, Urofsky & Finkelman report that

Here and there one could find a woman attorney; one was admitted to the Iowa bar in 1869. That same year, Illinois denied admission to Myra Bradwell, a lawyer’s wife and suffragist. The Illinois Supreme Court declared that the “hot strife of the bar, in the presence of the public,” would destroy femininity…the nation’s highest court held similar views, and it would not be until Illinois changed its law that Bradwell gained admission to the bar, in 1890. By 1910, about 1,500 women practiced law in this country; in 1920, the number was still small, with women constituting only 3 percent of American lawyers.[20]

But are legislators not justified in acknowledging that there are instances, according to reason, justice and circumstance, to treat the sexes differently where it is warranted and would ultimately be in the best interests of the nation’s families and in the best interests of society overall? And was the Illinois Supreme Court not indeed justified in fearing that femininity would be destroyed? Until recently, legislators recognized that the state had a compelling interest in taking notice of the very real differences between men and women and judges as well would take judicial notice of this fact. Myra Bradwell was a married woman, yet determined on a career path, appealed her case to the United States Supreme Court in the case of Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130 (1872). What she found was a high court unwilling to declare Unconstitutional under the Constitution and laws of the United States the right of a state to treat women, especially married women, differently from men when reason and justice warranted:

The claim of the plaintiff, who is a married woman, to be admitted to practice as an attorney and counselor at law is based upon the supposed right of every person, man or woman, to engage in any lawful employment for a livelihood…

It certainly cannot be affirmed, as an historical fact, that this has ever been established as one of the fundamental privileges and immunities of the sex. On the contrary, the civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman. Man is, or should be, woman’s protector and defender. The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. The Constitution of the family organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance as well as in the nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood. The harmony, not to say identity, of interest and views which belong, or should belong, to the family institution is repugnant to the idea of a woman adopting a distinct and independent career from that of her husband. So firmly fixed was this sentiment in the founders of the common law that it became a maxim of that system of jurisprudence that a woman had no legal existence separate from her husband, who was regarded as her head and representative in the social state, and, notwithstanding some recent modifications of this civil status, many of the special rules of law flowing from and dependent upon this cardinal principle still exist in full force in most states. One of these is that a married woman is incapable, without her husband’s consent, of making contracts which shall be binding on her or him. This very incapacity was one circumstance which the Supreme Court of Illinois deemed important in rendering a married woman incompetent fully to perform the duties and trusts that belong to the office of an attorney and counselor.

It is true that many women are unmarried and not affected by any of the duties, complications and incapacities arising out of the married state, but these are exceptions to the general rule. The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator. And the rules of civil society must be adapted to the general constitution of things, and cannot be based upon exceptional cases.

 The humane movements of modern society, which have for their object the multiplication of avenues for woman’s advancement, and of occupations adapted to her condition and sex, have my heartiest concurrence. But I am not prepared to say that it is one of her fundamental rights and privileges to be admitted into every office and position, including those which require highly special qualifications and demanding special responsibilities. In the nature of things, it is not every citizen of every age, sex, and condition that is qualified for every calling and position. It is the prerogative of the legislator to prescribe regulations founded on nature, reason, and experience for the due admission of qualified persons to professions and callings demanding special skill and confidence. This fairly belongs to the police power of the state, and, in my opinion, in view of the peculiar characteristics, destiny, and mission of woman, it is within the province of the legislature to ordain what offices, positions, and callings shall be filled and discharged by men, and shall receive the benefit of those energies and responsibilities, and that decision and firmness which are presumed to predominate in the sterner sex.[21]

If such an opinion were to be issued today, impeachment proceedings would begin immediately. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, writing the opinion for the court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, cited the very opinion in Bradwell as being “no longer consistent with our understanding of the family, the individual, or the Constitution,” exclaiming that

  This conclusion rests upon the basic nature of marriage and the nature of our Constitution: ‘[T]he marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup…’

The Constitution protects individuals, men and women alike, from unjustified state interference, even when that interference is enacted into law for the benefit of their spouses.

There was a time, not so long ago, when a different understanding of the family and of the Constitution prevailed. In Bradwell v. State, 16 Wall. 130 (1873), three Members of this Court reaffirmed the common-law principle that ‘a woman had no legal existence separate from her husband, who was regarded as her head and representative in the social state…’ These views, of course, are no longer consistent with our understanding of the family, the individual, or the Constitution.

…A husband has no enforceable right to require a wife to advise him before she exercises her personal choices…A State may not give to a man the kind of dominion over his wife that parents exercise over their children…Women do not lose their constitutionally protected liberty when they marry.[22]

Severe emphasis was put upon the separate existence of husband and wife in O’Connor’s opinion. But our ancestors feared this separate existence of husband and wife. The very existence of coverture was to safeguard the institution of marriage, of which all agreed formed the basis of civilized society. Allowing a woman to contract separately and live an independent existence as such from her husband was denounced. Turning once again to Chancellor Kent:

In Hatchett v Baddeley…the C.B. held, that a feme covert eloping from her husband, and running in debt, could not be sued alone, for that no act of the wife could make her liable to be sued alone. If she could be sued, she could sue, acquire property, and release actions, and this would overturn first principles. In no case, said one of the judges, can a feme covert be sued alone, except in the known excepted cases of abjuration or exile, where the husband is considered as dead, and the woman as a widow. It was afterwards held by the same court…that if the wife had even a separate maintenance, and lived apart from her husband, she could not be sued alone. There was no instance in the books, said the court, of an action being sustained against the wife, when the husband was living at home, and under no civil disability. A wife may acquire a separate character by the civil death of her husband, but she cannot acquire it by a voluntary separation…

…Afterwards, in Clayton v. Adams…the court of K.B. went a step further…and held, that though the wife lived apart from her husband, and carried on a separate trade, she was not suable; for if she could be sued as a feme sole, she might be taken in execution, which would operate as a divorce between husband and wife. At last, in Marshall v. Rutton, the K.B. decided, in 1800, after a very solemn argument, before all the judges, that a feme covert could not contract, and be sued, as a feme sole, even though she be living apart from her husband, with his consent, and have a separate maintenance secured to her by deed. The court said, that the husband and wife, being but one person in law, were unable to contract with each other, and that such a contract, with the consequences attached to it, of giving the wife a capacity to contract, and to sue and be sued, would contravene the general policy of the law in settling the relations of domestic life, and would introduce all the confusion and inconvenience, which must necessarily result from so anomalous and mixed a character as such a married woman would be. The only way in which such a separation can be safe and effectual, is, by having recourse to trustees, in whom the property, of which it is intended the wife shall have the disposition, may vest, uncontrolled by the rights of the husband, and it would fall within the province of a court of equity, to recognize and enforce such a trust. At law, a woman cannot be sued as a feme sole, while the relation of marriage subsists, and she and her husband are living under the same government.[23]


[19] Quoted in Urofsky & Finkelman, Documents of American Constitutional and Legal History, Volume I, p.539.

[20] Ibid., p. 504.; Women have been allowed to practice before the Supreme Court of the United States since 1879. 20 Stat. 292, see Louis Fisher & Katy J. Harriger, American Constitutional Law, Volume 2, Tenth Edition: Constitutional Rights Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (Durham, 2013), p 852. “[Senator Aaron] SARGENT [R-Cal.]…That there is no jealousy or consideration of impropriety on its part in the various States is shown by the fact that the Legislatures of many of the States have recently admitted women to the bar; and my own State, California, has passed such a law within the last week or two. Illinois has done the same thing; so have Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, and North Carolina; and Wyoming, Utah, and the District of Columbia among the Territories have also done it…

“Mr. SARGENT…The medical universities of the world are receiving women and instructing them in medicine and surgery, and there are many women engaged in these studies and practicing this profession…They are admitted into the Scotch school and some of the best medical schools of the United States, and they are making their way in them all. There are in the various States of the Union women lawyers; and women in literature have won a very high place…” Ibid., pp.852-53. (From 7 Cong. Rec. 2704 (1878) and 8 Cong. Rec. 1084 (1879)).

[21] Bradwell v. The State, 83 U.S. 130, 140-42 (1872); and see In re Goodell, 39 Wis._ (1875) (Case before the Wisconsin Supreme Court of an unmarried woman, R. Lavinia Goodell): “Nature has tempered woman as little for the juridical conflicts of the court room, as for the physical conflicts of the battle field. Womanhood is moulded for gentler and better things. And it is not the saints of the world who chiefly give employment to our profession. It has essentially and habitually to do with all that is selfish and malicious, knavish and criminal, coarse and brutal, repulsive and obscene in human life. It would be revolting to all female sense of the innocence and sanctity of their sex, shocking to man’s reverence for womanhood and faith in woman, on which hinge all the better affections and humanities of life, that woman should be permitted to mix professionally in all the nastiness of the world which finds its way into courts of justice; all the unclean issues, all the collateral questions of sodomy, incest, rape, seduction, fornication, adultery, pregnancy, bastardy, legitimacy, prostitution, lascivious cohabitation, abortion, infanticide, obscene publications, libel and slander of sex, impotence, divorce: all the nameless catalogue of indecencies, la chronique scandaleuse of all the vices and all the infirmities of all society, with which the profession has to deal, and which go towards filling judicial reports which must be read for accurate knowledge of the law. This is bad enough for men…”

[22] Planned Parenthood Of Southeastern PA. V. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 896-98 (1992).; and see United States v Dege 364 U.S. 51 (1960). “For this Court now to act on Hawkin’s formulation of the medieval view that husband and wife ‘are esteemed but as one person in Law, and are presumed to have but one Will’ would indeed be a ‘blind imitation of the past.’ It would require us to disregard the vast changes in the status of woman—the extension of her rights and correlative duties—whereby a wife’s legal submission to her husband has been wholly wiped out, not only in the English-speaking world generally but emphatically so in this country…Suffice it to say that we cannot infuse into the conspiracy statute a fictitious attribution to Congress of regard for  the medieval notion of a woman’s submissiveness to the benevolent coercive powers of a husband in order to relive her of her obligation of obedience to an unqualifiedly expressed Act of Congress by regarding her as a person whose legal personality is merged in that of her husband making the two one. Id., at 54-55. Chief Justice Warren issued a dissenting opinion stating the obvious new status of wives: “The problem, as the Court sees it, is almost absurdly uncomplicated: the basis for the notion that husband and wife are not subject to a conspiracy charge is that man and wife are one; but we know that man and wife are two, not one…” Id., at 55.

[23] Kent, Commentaries on American Law, Vol II, pp. 158, 160.

The Guardianship of a Woman, Part IV: There is No Good “Wave” of Feminism

[The Guardianship of a Woman FULL ARTICLE PDF here (link stays on-site)]


There Is No Good “Wave” of Feminism


There are those who contend that the first “wave” of feminism was “innocent” and perhaps even necessary and good. But the reality of the matter is that there has never been any good or justifiable “wave” of feminism. The goals of feminism have always been the same since its very inception. That is, its goals were to destroy the family, destroy marriage, and create dissension and antagonism between men and women. Indeed, not only was the wrongful guise of feminism to “liberate” women from the supposed “slavery” that was marriage, feminism’s ultimate goal has always been to liberate men from their rightful responsibilities as well, creating the modern society that we have today of unmotivated men disinterested in marriage and unchaste and vulgar women, incapable of finding that true depth of happiness and fulfillment in life that feminism was supposed to secure for the female sex.

In July of 1848, at Seneca Falls, New York, a group of racially and sexually integrated women’s rights activists made the infamous Declaration of Seneca Falls Convention. After a C-grade rehashing of the Declaration of Independence, the Seneca Falls Declaration read:


The history of mankind is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations on the part of man toward woman, having in direct object the establishment of an absolute tyranny over her. To prove this, let facts be submitted to a candid world.

He has never permitted her to exercise her inalienable right to the elective franchise.

He has compelled her to submit to laws, in the formation of which she had no voice.

He has withheld from her rights which are given to the most ignorant and degraded men- both natives and foreigners.

Having deprived her of this first right of a citizen, the elective franchise, thereby leaving her without representation in the halls of legislation, he has oppressed her on all sides.

He has made her, if married, in the eye of the law, civilly dead.

He has taken from her all right in property, even to the wages she earns.

He has made her, morally, an irresponsible being, as she can commit many crimes with impunity, provided they be done in the presence of her husband. In the covenant of marriage, she is compelled to promise obedience to her husband, he becoming to all intents and purposes, her master- the law giving him power to deprive her of her liberty, and to administer chastisement.

He has so framed the laws of divorce, as to what shall be the proper causes, and in case of separation, to whom the guardianship of the children shall be given, as to be wholly regardless of the happiness of women- the law, in all cases, going upon a false supposition of the supremacy of man, and giving all power into his hands.

After depriving her of all rights as a married woman, if single, and the owner of property, he has taxed her to support a government which recognizes her only when her property can be made profitable to it.

He has monopolized nearly all the profitable employments, and from those she is permitted to follow, she receives but a scanty remuneration. He closes against her all the avenues to wealth and distinction which he considers most honorable to himself. As a teacher of theology, medicine, or law, she is not known…

He has endeavored, in every way that he could, to destroy her confidence in her own powers, to lessen her self-respect, and to make her willing to lead a dependent and abject life.

Now, in view of this entire disfranchisement of one-half the people of this country, their social and religious degradation- in view of the unjust laws above mentioned, and because women do feel themselves aggrieved, oppressed, and fraudulently deprived of their most sacred rights, we insist that they have immediate admission to all the rights and privileges which belong to them as citizens of the United States.

In entering upon the great work before us, we anticipate no small amount of misconception, misrepresentation, and ridicule; but we shall use every instrumentality within our power to effect our object. We shall employ agents, circulate tracts, petition the State and National legislatures, and endeavor to enlist the pulpit and the press in our behalf. We hope this Convention will be followed by a series of Conventions embracing every part of the country.[16]


The ladies and their male feminist supporters got their way. And what has been the result of all of this? What have been the ultimate consequences to every life in existence in America today? Even assuming that half of their assertions (half were only religious grievances- left out of the excerpt above- for which there was no redress at law in either case) were even true in the first place regarding the alleged abuses that man had supposedly inflicted upon the female sex, was what they were campaigning and petitioning for even a good cause in the first place? Before our own modern biases accede “yes” to the proposed question simply because it falls in line with modern mainstream propaganda, perhaps a deeper reflection about this issue is warranted. It can’t be supposed that their proposal was ever meant to lead to anything other than the complete annihilation of marriage and gender both at a social and legal level such as we have today. Those such as Elizabeth Cady Stanton were also advocates for marriage-law reform and liberalized divorce “as a needed outlet for men and women trapped in failed marriages.”[17] Does this sound suspiciously modern? Consider the following case and examine just how closely it resembles 21st century mainstream relationships today:


The Supreme Court of Kansas staked out the boundaries of nuptial freedom in an 1887 ruling that welcomed common-law marriage into the state. The justices sustained the conviction of E.C. Walker and Lillian Harman for illicit cohabitation. During their wedding the pair had proclaimed their hostility to conventional matrimony in terms reminiscent of those expressed at the 1848 wedding of the women’s rights crusaders Lucy Stone and Henry Blackwell. Calling themselves Autonomists, the couple publicly declared their bond while repudiating all statutory controls on marriage. At the commencement of the ceremony, the bride’s father read an elaborate statement of the sect’s view of marriage as a “strictly personal matter.” The bride and groom denied “the right of society, in the form of church and state to regulate it, or interfere with the individual man and woman in this relation.” They dispensed with the traditional nuptial promise “to love and honor” each other, since this might not be possible to sustain. The groom also renounced his legal right to change his wife’s name, take her property, and retain custody of their children. Instead, he promised her complete equality. The bride then pledged that her fidelity would be guided by her conscience. After these pronouncements were published in the sect’s journal, local authorities arrested, convicted, and sentenced the pair to the county jail.

The ceremony repelled the state bench. Though the justices agreed that under the common law, nuptial regulations were merely directory, they refused to confer the status of common-law marriage on this union. Chief Justice Albert Horton thundered his opinion: “They have lived together, but had no intention of creating that relation of status known and defined by law and by customs and usages of all civilized societies as marriage. Thus living together under such circumstances did not in law constitute a valid marriage.” The court defended the state’s nuptial authority and refuted the plea that Walker and Harman’s civil rights has been violated. Instead, they assured the citizenry that the lax provisions of the law were amendable to reason.[18]


What was once shocking has now become mainstream under the guise of equality, civil rights and erroneous judicial interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, replete with the usurpation of all power by the Federal government, thereby wholly denying to the states the right to make their own laws to govern family life.


[16] Quoted in Melvin I. Urofsky & Paul Finkelman, Documents of American Constitutional and Legal History, Volume I (New York, 2002), pp. 327-28.

[17] Michael Grossberg, Governing the Hearth, Law and the Family in Nineteenth-Century America (Chapel Hill, 1985), p. 87.

[18] Ibid., pp. 97-98.